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The Sampoong Mall Collapse – How Greed Led to South Korea’s Largest Peacetime Disaster

By Visio Roughton

Corporations will often skirt around rules in the name of turning a profit. Oftentimes, the dangerous conditions that come from this will go unchecked until tragedy strikes. This is something many people experience daily, and historically, the destructive influence of corporate greed has devastated thousands of lives. Some of the worst peacetime disasters in modern history came about because of this overzealous need for money. In one notable incident, cutting corners and ignoring advice in the name of profit would lead to one of the worst civilian peacetime disasters ever to take place. 

South Korea’s Infrastructure Booms, The Sampoong Mall is Built: 

The 1980s and 90s were instrumental in the expansion of the infrastructure and economy of South Korea, and this included Seoul, the country’s capital city. One factor that spurred this growth was the fact that Seoul would host the 1988 Summer Olympics. To prepare for the event, and also grow the infrastructure, many companies put their focus toward building new, larger, and more extravagant buildings. The construction of a notable shopping mall came about during this construction boom. Around this time there were also bans implemented that prevented companies from hiring international contractors to work on construction projects in Seoul. This combined with the increased demand for more buildings meant that the structures built around this time were often built with more speed than normal and with less caution for regulations. 

The Sampoong Group spearheaded the project, and in 1987 they ordered construction of the superstore to begin. The mall was built in Seoul’s Seocho District on a plot of land that had been previously used as a landfill. Initial plans for the building indicated that the project was only set to be a 4-story residential building, however, these were later changed. Lee Joon, the new chairman of the Sampoong Group’s construction division ordered these changes and pushed for the removal of some of the planned support beams of the building so that there would be room to build an escalator. This was done to add a fifth floor that was originally slated to be a rollerskate rink, but would later be changed to be a food court. 

At the time, Woosung Construction was in charge of the project, however, after these proposed changes, Woosung voiced concerns over the potential ramifications of these alterations and refused to carry them out. As a result, Lee Joon terminated their contract and instead hired his own company to finish the store’s construction. Two years later, in late 1989, construction of the Mall was completed and on July 7, 1990, the store officially opened to the public. On average the store managed to attract around 40,000 patrons on average every day while it was in operation.

Warning Signs:

When Lee Joon decided to turn the fifth level into a food court, he also decided to include floors that were heated by water pipes. This added to the already unplanned weight of the building and put significant strain on the concrete slabs that made up the floors. Whilst this was happening, three air conditioning units weighing thirty thousand pounds each were installed on the roof, further exacerbating the strain on the building’s supports. 

The units themselves were very loud and residents of nearby apartment buildings complained about the noise from the air conditioning units, so they were moved to the other side of the building. Rather than bringing in a crane to do this, pullies and rollers were used to drag each unit across the roof. This created an assortment of deep cracks in the concrete of the roof that were not fixed. The vibrations of the units only worked to worsen the cracks. The cracks spread down to the actual support columns, and in the time soon before the collapse of the building, people reported being able to see these cracks in the pillars and wall of the 5th floor. These cracks were reported numerous times, and inspections were carried out, however, inspectors never marked anything as wrong or concerning. 

In April of 1995, two months prior to the events of June 29th, signs of the impending disaster became visible. Cracks had appeared along the ceiling of the fifth floor and its support beams, alarming staff and patrons. Although investigations were carried out, none of the damage was flagged as concerning, and as a solution to the cracks, Lee Joon ordered his staff to move merchandise and stores from the top floor, down to the basement to lessen the number of people who would travel to the fifth floor.

On the morning of June 29, 1995, there had been a significant increase in the amount of visible cracks on the fifth floor. In response, store managers moved to close sections of the top floor only, and made no move to close the rest of the building. 

Once again, engineers were brought in to inspect the mall, and they found that the building was at a significantly high risk of collapse. Five hours before the mall collapsed, many unusual bangs from the top floor rang out through the store. This was because the cracks had been continuously worsened by the vibrations of the air conditioner units on the roof. The units were shut off, however the damage was already done. 

The board of the Sampoong Group held an emergency meeting to discuss what they should do once the building’s instability became clear. Many board members suggested the customers and staff should be evacuated, however, due to the unusually high volume of patrons that day, Lee Joon refused to do this. Instead, Lee Joon and the rest of the executives left the building without warning the staff or customers. All of the executives were able to exit the building safely before its collapse later that evening. 

Collapse:

At about 5:00 p.m., about fifty minutes before the collapse, the ceiling of the fifth floor began to sink in on itself, and staff cut off all customer access to the fifth floor. Around 5:52 pm, more audible cracking sounds from the ceiling and supports were heard, and staff immediately tried to evacuate the shoppers, but the building’s damage had progressed too far by that point for anything to be done. The roof completely fell in on itself, crumbling under the weight of the A/C units. The fifth floor, which had already been pushed to its breaking point, collapsed under the sudden increased weight of the building’s support columns, which were strained by the installation of the escalators. What followed was a domino effect as the floors crashed into each other and collapsed. In less than a minute, the store’s south wing collapsed entirely, killing 502 people and leaving over 1,500 trapped in the rubble. 

It took very little time for emergency and rescue crews to begin initial rescue efforts, and the following day cranes and other heavy equipment were brought in, but due to concerns regarding the instability of the building’s rubble, Seoul’s mayor, Choi Pyong-yol halted the rescue efforts. This triggered massive protests throughout the city, and Choi along with other officials agreed to to resume the search after the remains of the building were stabilized. 

They continued to pull survivors from the rubble for over two weeks. Officials declared that the search efforts would be switched to recovery rather than rescue, however, some people managed to survive until then by drinking rainwater that trickled down to them through the rubble.  19-year-old store clerk Park Seung-hyun was the last person to be pulled from the rubble alive 17 days after the collapse with a few scratches. 

Aftermath:

Initially, the collapse was believed to be the result of a gas leak or a terrorist attack from neighboring North Korea, but after an investigation led by Professor Chung Lan of Dankook University’s engineering school, these theories were dismissed.

After the focus of the investigation switched to the structural integrity and failure of the building, the glaring problems with the building’s construction became apparent. Investigators first believed the building’s failure was due to the unstable ground on the landfill it was built on, however after an examination of the rubble, it became clear that the materials used for the building were partly to blame for the disaster. Substandard concrete, made with a mix of cement and seawater, combined with insufficient reinforcement in the walls and ceilings indicated that there had been an effort to cut corners to use cheaper building materials. Further scrutiny of the building’s construction revealed errors in the use of “flat slab construction,” a technique where floor slabs are supported directly on columns without beams. This method requires proper reinforcement around columns to prevent them from punching through the slab. The change of the column placement to put in the escalators, along with the reduction of the pillar size on the fifth floor both affected the integrity of the roof and fifth floor. Additionally, it was discovered that the steel reinforcements in the floors were put in incorrectly, something that reduced the structure’s overall strength by about 20%. 

Ultimately, it was discovered that moving the A/C units, and the way it was gone about, was the factor that triggered the final blow to the building’s health. The cracks left by dragging the units across the roof rather than moving them via crane sent the cracks in the roof downward, leaving one of the support columns severely damaged. Others were damaged and these cracks were worsened by the vibrations from the A/C units. Although they were shut off on the day of the collapse, the damage was too severe, and it was the support columns that gave away first.

Lee Joon was found guilty of criminal negligence on December 27, 1995, and received a prison sentence of ten and a half years, which was later reduced to seven and a half years.  Lee Joon’s son and the mall’s CEO, Lee Han-sang, was also charged for the incident and was given a sentence of seven years for accidental homicide and corruption. City officials Lee Chung-Woo and Hwang Chol-Min were found guilty of accepting bribes to excuse the building’s poor condition and both men received a ten-year prison sentence. Other city officials, the store executives, and the company responsible for building the mall were also given punishments for their involvement. 

Two months after the collapse, Lee Joon and Lee Han-sang also offered up their entire group’s wealth to help compensate the victims and families affected by the disaster. As a result of this, the Sampoong Group essentially dissolved. 

This incident sparked significant reforms and changes to regulation in South Korea’s construction industry. New laws and regulations were introduced that focused on improving structural integrity for buildings, and ensuring that the industry itself would allow for more transparency to the public, and hold the industry more accountable for its actions. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Sampoong Mall collapse, many buildings throughout Seoul, especially those built during the infrastructure boom during the 80s and early 90s were reinspected. Many were deemed to be structurally unsafe and were subjected to rigorous rebuilding and construction. 

Initially meant to be a place for luxury and entertainment, the Sampoong Mall instead went down in history as a representation of how corruption and cutting corners in construction can affect a community. The incident is the deadliest peacetime disaster in South Korea, even today, and at the time it was also the deadliest accidental building collapse in modern history until the 2013 Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh. 

Today, the site where the mall once stood is now a set of luxury apartment complexes, and a memorial to the victims of the disaster designed by Professor Kim Bong-gu of Ewha Womans University and funded by the Sampoong Group can be found in The Yangjae Citizen’s Forest, located in Seoul’s Seocho District.

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